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Knowledge Spillovers from Creation to Exploitation: A Theoretical Model 
with Implications for Firms and Public Policy 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The non-rival nature of knowledge was explored and identified as a key ingredient in 
modern endogenous growth theory (e.g. Romer, 1986). This non-rivalry opens up the 
possibility for knowledge spillovers between those that create knowledge and those that 
reap the commercial benefits from it. This possibility has attracted attention in fields 
ranging from technology spillovers (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Keller, 2002; Griffith et 
al. 2004; Cameron et al. 2005), international trade (Krugman, 1987; Feenstra, 1996), 
spatial agglomeration (Jaffe et al., 1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Lawson and 
Lorenz, 1999; Gertler, 2001), real options (Martzoukos and Zacharias, 2008), networks 
(Oliva  and  Rivera-Batiz,  1997;  Carayannis  et  al.,  2006),  the  evolution  of  industries 
(Niosi and Banik, 2005; Agarwal et al., 2007) and health economics (Ho, 2002).  
The  existing  aggregate  growth  models,  however,  typically  collapse  invention 
and innovation into one decision and either stress the role of knowledge creation (e.g. 
idea-driven growth models following Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991) or 
new  firm/product  entry  (e.g.  the  class  of  Schumpeterian  growth  models  following 
Aghion and Howitt, 1991; Segerstrom et al., 1990).  
A notable exception in the growth literature is Michellacci (2003), who presents 
a model of aggregate endogenous growth in which the searching and matching behavior 
between  inventors  and  entrepreneurs  is  modeled  explicitly.  In  his  model  more 
entrepreneurship increases the returns to knowledge creation and the other way around   3 
as more intensive search on either side speeds up the commercialization of knowledge 
and  thereby  increases  the  discounted  return  to  both  activities.  In  addition,  he  also 
introduces  bargaining  over  the  rents  from  innovation  and  explicitly  allows  for 
specialization  in  tasks  between  inventors  and  innovators.  Michelacci’s  (2003) 
conclusions  clearly  underline  the  importance  of  developing  and  supporting  both 
activities in tandem.  
We share this conclusion; however, we arrive at it with a different set-up that is 
closer to the traditional innovation-driven growth models, following the narrative in the 
“knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship” as outlined in Acs et al. (2009). In our 
model we assume that a direct knowledge spillovers exists between knowledge creation 
and  commercialization.  In  addition,  we  model  two  indirect  aggregate  knowledge 
spillovers,  from  knowledge  creation  in  the  past  to  the  present,  and  from 
entrepreneurship in the past to knowledge creation in the present. This makes our results 
more  comparable  to  those  in  endogenous  growth  theory  but  changes  several  of  the 
implications for strategic innovation management at both the firm and the aggregate 
level. 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  thus  to  develop  a  model  of  innovation-driven 
economic  growth  in  which  the  role  of  knowledge  spillovers  between  knowledge 
creation (invention) and knowledge commercialization (innovation) is made explicit. 
With this model we aim to study the impact of such spillovers for strategic innovation 
management at the individual firm and aggregate economy level.  
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. Models that separate between these 
stages in the innovation process - invention and commercialization - are scarce and 
typically partial in scope, as we have argued above. Our general equilibrium innovation-  4 
driven endogenous growth model seeks to fill that gap. More importantly we are, to our 
knowledge, the first to introduce these well established and rigorous macro-economic 
modeling  techniques  to  the  field  of  strategic  entrepreneurship,  where  they  can  help 
understand the interplay between micro-level innovation management and macro-level 
aggregate economic performance.   
We  conclude  from  our  model  that  there  is  scope  for  efficiency  enhancing 
innovation  management  strategies  by  internalizing  direct  knowledge  spillovers  from 
firm level R&D through strategic entrepreneurial ventures. Moreover, we show that the 
traditional form of knowledge spillover internalization, the intellectual property rights 
protection  regime,  cannot  internalize  all  relevant  spillovers  and  may  in  fact  be 
counterproductive.  Instead,  we  propose  that  the  full  internalization  of  knowledge 
spillovers may be achieved through a mix of strategic entrepreneurship (incumbents 
supporting  strategic  new  entry  and  spin-outs)  and  intrapreneurship  (incumbents 
exploiting new opportunities themselves) at the firm level, and policies that support 
both stages in the innovation process, knowledge creation and commercialization, at the 
aggregate level.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
Section 3 discusses implications for firm and public innovation management and policy. 
Section 4 concludes and sets the future agenda. 
 
2.  A Model of Entrepreneurial Rents and Growth 
 
Consider  a  three  sector,  two-factor  economy  in  which  consumers  consume,  save  to 
accumulate  raw  capital,  and  supply  their  labor  exogenously.  Final  goods  producers   5 
produce  consumption  goods  using  labor  and  intermediate  capital  goods,  invest  in 
knowledge creation (R&D) to improve their productivity and reduce production costs. 
Intermediate goods producers supply them with an expanding variety of intermediate 
goods that are produced with raw capital, obtained in capital markets and introducing a 
new variety requires the input of labor resources.  
The financial flows in our model can then be illustrated in Figure 1, where the 
arrows represent real money flows in terms of the final good that is the numeraire. 
Below, we introduce our notation and give the exact definition of the arrows. Then we 
shortly discuss the agents and discuss what problem they solve under what constraints. 
Finally,  we  discuss  how  the  markets  in  the  model  equilibrate,  before  turning  to  an 
analysis of the equilibrium in the next section. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Consumers 
With numbers referring to the arrows in the figure, consumers have two outgoing and 
two incoming flows. 
 
1.  Consumption of C (at price P=1). 
2.  Savings rB+wL* - C, which are invested in bonds, B, yielding interest rate r. 
3.  Interest income rB. 
4.  Labor income wL* where total labor is supplied inelastically and normalized to 1. 
   6 
Consumers in our model receive interest and labor income every period and spend 
their income on consumption and the purchase of new bonds. They maximize a standard 









s.t.: ˙  B  t = wtL*+rtBt −Ct
 
where U is the utility index, ρ is the discount factor and a dot over the variable denotes 
time derivative.  
It is a standard result that consumers will then maximize their utility by choosing 
consumption  (and  implicitly  savings)  in  every  period  following  the  Ramsey-rule 
(Ramsey, 1928) such that a constant fraction of income is saved when the interest rate is 
constant and exceeds the discount rate (see e.g. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004): 
                (I) 
 
Final Goods Producers 
Total  consumption,  C,  equals  the  sales  and  production,  Y,  of  final  goods  producers 
every period as we assume the market for final goods clears instantly. The next four 
arrows then relate to the behavior of final goods producers, who are price takers in 
factor and output markets.  
 
5.  Wages wLP where LP is labor employed in production and w is the wage. 
6.  Costs of n intermediate goods   bought at price χ(i) and in quantity x(i). 
7.  R&D wages wLR where LR is labor employed in R&D.   7 
8.  Investment in R&D (equal to labor costs) financed in the capital market by issuing 
new bonds. 
9.  Interest payments on the stock of bonds outstanding. 
 
For the final goods producers to have an incentive to do R&D we introduce the firm 
specific factor “knowledge”, A, into their production function and specify the process 
by which they can increase that knowledge stock. Firms then choose the optimal levels 
of production and R&D employment and their use of intermediate goods at every point 


































where ψ is a scaling parameter and parameters β, α and γ are the output elasticities of 
labor, L, and accumulated knowledge, A, in production and R&D output, respectively.  
Note that we have assumed that R&D in the final goods sector receives two 
positive and aggregate knowledge spillovers: one from past R&D through A, and one 
from past entrepreneurship through the existing variety in intermediates, n. This reflects 
the assumption that it is easier to do R&D from an already large knowledge base and it 
is  easier  to  increase  productivity  in  the  final  goods  sector  when  a  lot  of  different 
specialized intermediates are available.  
By the assumed symmetry and constant returns to scale specification we can 
study the behavior of a representative firm and solve the above dynamic optimization 
                                                 
1 We have dropped the time arguments to economize on notation.   8 
problem (see e.g. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004) for more details on the mathematical 
techniques).
2 The demand for production labor and individual intermediate variety i are 






                  (II) 
            (III) 




α˙  A /AY
(r− ˙  w /w + γ˙  n /n)w
              (IV) 
as long as the wage is below the cut-off level, 
€ 
w  R that is given by
3: 
€ 
w  R =
αYψ(A/n)
−γ
r− ˙  w /w + γ˙  n /n ( )
              (V) 
  
Intermediate Goods Producers 
The expenditure of final goods producers on intermediates is symmetric (see equation 
(III)) and total expenditure is equal to the capital share in final output. There are four 
additional arrows into and out of the intermediate sector that exhaust the value of total 
sales as profits in this sector are paid out to the owners of the firms. 
 
                                                 
2 Even if the knowledge stock is allowed to differ among final goods producers it can be shown that only 
those that have A=A
max will employ R&D workers and increase their A such that the firms with lower 
knowledge stocks will diminish. 
3 There actually is a horizontal demand curve for R&D labor due to the assumed linearity in R&D labor in 
the innovation function. The demand for R&D labor therefore is proportional to the growth rate of A in 
equation (IV).   9 
10. Rental costs of the raw capital used in producing intermediate goods and financed 
with bonds, rK. 
11. Dividends on ownership shares and /or interest on loans equal to the expected value 
of rents   at entry, to finance start-up investments that we assume equal 
the wages (foregone) by the entrepreneur (or paid to the intrapreneur). 
12. Investment in entry (equal to labor costs) financed by issuing stocks and/or bonds by 
new entrants (or incumbent firms). 
13. Labor costs of entry in intermediate sector financed by issuing stock or bonds, wLE. 
 
Intermediate producers are assumed to be monopolists in producing their respective 
varieties and they set prices to maximize their profits. A simple production technology 
that converts one unit of raw capital into a unit of the intermediate variety, completes 
the problem for the intermediate producer: 
 
The intermediate goods producers then sets his price as a mark-up over marginal costs: 
                (VI) 
As  marginal  costs  are  equal  for  all  varieties,  all  varieties  are  priced  and 
consequently, by equation (III), are used in final production at the same level. Given 
that producing a new variety yields positive profits, new entrants have an incentive to   10 
commercialize ideas for new varieties.
4 We assume that this commercialization process 
is costly in terms of labor and specify the entry process as: 
                   (VII) 
where  ϕ  is  a  scaling  parameter  and  we  have  assumed  that  new  variety  creation  is 
proportional to the stock of accumulated R&D knowledge in final goods production. 
This reflects our assumption that R&D in final goods production generates a lot of 
direct  knowledge  spillovers  in  the  form  of  new  ideas  and  opportunities  for  new 
intermediate goods.  
Below  we  will  discuss  why  such  spillovers  are  direct  and  create  the 
opportunities for strategic entre- or intrapreneurial ventures. In the model, new entry is 
worthwhile as long as the wage is below: 
            (VIII) 






(α + β)(1−α −β)˙  n /nY
(r+ ˙  n /n − ˙  Y /Y)w
            (IX) 
To finance the labor costs of entry, new entrants issue stock or bonds and in 
equilibrium the profits from intermediate goods’ production are exactly equal to the 
interest payments on bonds plus the dividend payments on stock.  
 
 
                                                 
4  One  can  read  incumbent  firms’  innovation  manager  in  lieu  of  new  entrants  and  the  logic  of  our 
arguments would not change. The cost to commercialize a new idea is in terms of wages and the pay-off 
is  due  to  (additional)  profits.  Incumbent  intermediate  producers  would  have  a  marginally  smaller 
incentive to enter with an additional variety, as they would compete also with their existing product lines. 
In large enough markets this would be a very small disadvantage and resource complementarities (not 
modeled here) are likely to more than offset such profit cannibalization. 
5 Again this is in fact a horizontal demand function due to the linearity of equation (VII) in labor. Both 
sides in (IX) are proportional to the level of entrepreneurial employment, as was the case in equation (V).   11 
Equilibrium 
The model equilibrates when all flows into and out of all the boxes add up to zero 
(which means agents solve their maximization problems given their constraints and do 
not leave any resources idle) and prices equilibrate the supply and demand on the two 
factor markets. It can be shown that this equilibrium exists and is both unique and stable 
and has positive growth in production and income. 
To  see  this,  recall  that  intermediate  producers  use  a  simple  one-for-one 
technology to create their intermediates from raw, homogenous capital. As in Romer 
(1990) the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)-production function at the final 
goods production stage implies that the intermediate varieties are imperfect substitutes 
in final goods production and thus a latent demand for all new varieties exists. The 
monopolists in the intermediate sector earn monopoly rents, creating an incentive for 
entry. Patent protection on existing intermediates might be assumed to prevent entry in 
the existing intermediate markets and leave entry with a new intermediate variety as the 
only alternative.
6 Instead one might also assume that the entrepreneur has and retains 
exclusive knowledge regarding his venture and competitors can never enter with perfect 
substitutes and drive profits to zero.
 7 This implies that entry can only take place with 
new varieties that are imperfect substitutes.  
Romer  (1990)  then  assumes  that  a  specialized  R&D  sector  generates  the 
blueprints for a new intermediate good and auctions them off to a competitive fringe of 
                                                 
6 In Aghion and Howitt (1992) these entrants drive out incumbents with a higher quality version of 
existing  varieties  and  entry  leads  to  average  quality  improvement  not  to  variety  expansion.  We 
acknowledge the fact that entrepreneurial activity may introduce improved versions of existing products 
but to keep our model tractable we follow Romer (1990) here and focus on variety expansion. 
7 Patent protection is problematic in this model as we assume that the knowledge creator is not the same 
agent as the knowledge commercializer. Patents are generally awarded to the knowledge creator. There is 
a large literature (Acs, 2008) that stresses the importance of the individual entrepreneur for the success of 
new ventures. His unique combination of cultural background, skills, knowledge, access to finance and 
other key resources and note least important, luck, makes it unlikely that any other entrant could enter the 
same market and drive down profits to zero by simply copying the incumbent.   12 
potential entrants. The downstream rents thus motivate and finance an R&D sector that 
generates new ideas. The only barrier to entry in Romer (1990) is the possession of a 
blueprint  and  therefore  the  R&D  firm,  the  knowledge  creator,  appropriates  the  full 
discounted rents in equilibrium. The entrepreneurial opportunity is created as a private 
property and commercialization is costless and automatic. 
We have assumed instead that new firm entry is costly and risky and we follow 
Schumpeter (1911) in assuming that new opportunities are pure and costless spillovers. 
Therefore, the associated rents are appropriated by the entrepreneur, leaving the one that 
commercializes  knowledge  as  the  residual  claimant  to  the  monopoly  rents.
8  The 
existence of such rents in equilibrium implies that there is a constant fraction of the 
labor force engaged in entrepreneurial venturing. It also implies that the rents from 
commercialization are not available to finance knowledge creation and no independent 
R&D sector as in Romer (1990) can exist in our model.  
However, knowledge needs to be created somewhere and for a clear economic 
purpose if we wish to avoid a return to the neoclassical “manna from heaven” growth 
models. Large amounts of investment in corporate R&D also suggest that knowledge 
creation is somehow profitable to the firms undertaking it. We would argue, however, 
that the improvement and more efficient production of existing products is the stated 
aim of the corporate R&D labs we see in the world today and not the generation and 
subsequent  auctioning  off  of  blueprints  for  new  (intermediate)  goods  as  in  Romer 
(1990). To make the generation of knowledge profitable to final goods producers in our 
                                                 
8  Although  in  expectation  terms  the  profits  flow  back  to  the  consumers  in  the  Figure  above,  the 
entrepreneur, more often than not, is that specific consumer and the profits are his expected returns on 
foregoing labor earnings during the entry stage. We have modeled this as the entrepreneur issuing stock 
and bonds to finance his wage costs to reflect the fact that they take such opportunity costs into account 
and desire a market determined return on their investment. Alternatively, one can interpret this as an 
existing firm financing an entre- or intrapreneurial venture by paying those involved at least their wage.   13 
model, these producers cannot operate under perfect competition with constant returns 
to scale in intermediates and labor as in Romer (1990). We assume instead that the 
production  function  has  constant  returns  to  three  factors  of  production:  labor,  an 
aggregate of intermediates, i.e. capital, and a stock of private production knowledge.  
Price taking on the demand side in labor and intermediate markets then implies 
that all firms have operating profits as wage and intermediates costs do not exhaust 
sales. This profit is the return to the firm specific knowledge stock. We assume that it 
needs to be accumulated prior to production so a new final goods producer must first 
accumulate  one  for  himself.  Free  entry  in  final  goods  production  will  therefore  not 
eliminate the operating profits. The stock of production knowledge can be augmented 
every period by doing R&D. Profit maximizing firms then choose a positive level of 
R&D labor that equates the discounted future value of additional operating profits to the 
marginal wage costs of their R&D-workers. 
It  can  be  shown  that  in  equilibrium  all  firms  will  have  the  same  level  of 
production  knowledge  and  R&D  investment.
9  Our  structure  makes  the  intended 
outcome  of  R&D,  efficiency  gains  to  the  firm,  a  pure  private  good  of  which  the 
intended returns can be fully appropriated.
10 The markets for labor and capital connect 
all  activities  and  close  our  model.  In  equilibrium  we  then  have  positive  economic 
growth due to productivity gains in final goods production (increases in A) and variety 
expansion in intermediates (increases in n). 
However, we also assumed that the R&D generates an accidental by-product; 
knowledge in the form of opportunities that the final goods producing firm does not 
commercialize. We also assume that final goods producing firms cannot prevent the 
                                                 
9 This follows intuitively from the assumption that all final goods producing firms are equal, face the 
same maximization problem, production possibilities, final demand curve and set of input prices. 
10 We discuss the precise set of assumptions we need to make for this result in Acs and Sanders (2008).   14 
spillover  of  that  knowledge  unless  they  enter  the  market  with  this  new  variety 
themselves.
11 
The  ideas  for  new  intermediate  goods  are  therefore  a  costless  knowledge 
spillover from incumbent firms’ R&D. Ongoing R&D in incumbent firms generates a 
flow  of  ideas,  some  of  which  are  commercialized  and  some  are  shelved  by  the 
incumbents  for  whatever  reasons  but  then  can  be  commercialized  through  new 
(intermediate)  firm  entry.  In  addition,  we  have  assumed  that  a  larger  variety  of 
intermediates increases the productivity of R&D in final goods production. This too is a 
costless (but indirect or aggregate) knowledge spillover. Private costs and revenues do 
not reflect these spillovers and hence we can derive that optimal growth requires the 
stimulation of either R&D or entrepreneurship.  
This follows from the general theory of externalities. Any activity that generates 
positive externalities will be undersupplied in a market equilibrium. That general result 
is ameliorated in our model by the assumed positive spillover going back and forth. As 
R&D has a positive impact on entrepreneurship but entrepreneurship also positively 
affects R&D, a central planner may improve the market outcome by stimulating only 
the  activity  that  is  the  bottleneck.  The  corollary  to  this  argument  implies  that  the 
positive external effect that justifies a subsidy on R&D, only materializes when entre- 
or  intrapreneurs  are  present  and  able  to  commercialize  knowledge  spillovers. 
Consequently, any policy that helps R&D but hurts entrepreneurship is less effective 
than direct R&D stimulation and may even be counterproductive.
12  
 
                                                 
11 And if there are such impediments, that would be a first target for policy. Acs et al. (2006) refer to the 
knowledge  filter  when  they  discuss  the  physical,  cultural,  political  and  institutional  barriers  to  such 
knowledge spillovers. 
12 See Acs and Sanders (2008) for an application to the role of patent protection in this context.   15 
This has a strong innovation policy implication. If we are correct in asserting 
that knowledge spillovers exists in both directions and specialization in the innovation 
chain  takes  place,  then  IPR-protection,  which  shifts  innovation  rents  from  the 
commercializer to the inventor, may reduce economic growth.  
The  next  section  elaborates  on  the  innovation  management  and  policy 
implications of the knowledge spillovers in our model. 
 
3.  Implications  
 
Our model has implications for innovation management at different levels of analysis. 
First, we can consider the firms that do R&D to increase their productivity. How should 
they deal with the fact that such R&D may generate new commercial opportunities as an 
unintended side product? Then we can turn to strategic entrepreneurship as a way for 
these firms to enhance value creation from a given level of R&D investment. Finally, 
the  existence  of  knowledge  spillovers  has  implications  for  the  policy  maker  at  the 




Let  us  first  consider  the  implications  for  innovation  management  in  final  goods 
producing firms that do R&D with the principal aim to reduce production costs and 
increase productivity. In our model these firms evaluate the productivity and success of 
their R&D departments only and primarily on achieving that goal (by hiring R&D labor 
up  to  the  point  where  marginal  costs  equal  marginal  private  benefits  from  to   16 
productivity  gains).  This  will  lead,  particularly  in  large  firms  and  hierarchically 
organized R&D departments, to an exclusive focus on output that benefits the current 
rather than possible future activities of the firm. Such a strong focus gives rise to the 
strategic disagreements that hurt motivation and creativity and may lead to potentially 
very  harmful  spin-outs.  Given  the  assumed  co-generation  of  valuable  commercial 
opportunities in our model, it makes more sense for the R&D managers to also reward 
the opportunities that are generated and may improve the firm’s overall performance in 
a more dynamic sense. Firms cannot afford to pass up on such opportunities in modern, 
competitive,  globalized  and  dynamic  markets  and  increasingly  seem  to  realize  this. 
More room, more autonomy and broader performance measures should be implemented 
to  motivate  and  manage  R&D  workers  and  teams  to  enhance  their  creativity  and 
increase their value added for the firm. This shift in innovation management policy, 
however, cannot be successful in isolation. The firm also needs to develop ways to 
recognize and act on the opportunities generated, without jeopardizing or neglecting its 
existing competitive advantages.   
  
Exploiting Commercial Opportunities 
In our model a new venture is worth undertaking when the (known) discounted value of 
the expected profit flow exceeds the costs of labor required to set up the venture. As the 
incumbent producer and new entrants have the same wage costs, the same discount rate 
and the same expected profit flow from the venture, their decisions should be the same 
as  well.  This  implies  that  final  goods  producers  would  simply  commercialize  all 
opportunities their R&D labs generate. The assumptions driving that result, however, 
are not very realistic. By relaxing them, keeping intact the structure of spillovers in our   17 
model, we can still make some informed comments on how to manage the knowledge 
spillovers from R&D to new firm formation. 
First  of  all,  the  returns  to  any  new  venture  are  inherently  unknown  and  the 
returns to entrepreneurial ventures are uncertain. In addition it may be hard for the 
creator  of  a  new  opportunity  to  actually  convince  his  innovation  manager  of  the 
technical and economic feasibility of his idea. The incumbent firms’ managers may 
have  good  reasons  to  be  reluctant.  There  are  many  examples  that  show  that  wild 
adventures may threaten the continuity of the core business. This conflict of strategic 
views does not imply automatically that the opportunity is lost. Studies, for example, by 
Klepper  (2001)  and  Klepper  and  Sleeper  (2005)  have  clearly  shown  that  strategic 
disagreement among R&D workers and senior management is often the reason for so 
called spin-out entrepreneurship. More generally, it has been shown (Agarwal et al., 
2004; Clarysse et al., 2005; Wennberg, 2008; Zhang, 2009) that new ventures spinning 
out of successful existing firms have a higher survival rate and performance.  
From this evidence one might again conclude that the incumbent firms should 
commercialize all opportunities that arise in its R&D labs to internalize the positive 
knowledge spillover. But for every success, there are failures also. In the literature the 
case study methods applied and the strong survival bias in selection of the firms and 
industries studied may bias the general picture. In most cases the ex ante (perceived) 
risks are high and prudent innovation management requires the development of these 
more radical ideas outside the organization to avoid disruption to the core business. 
  One way of doing so is to use strategic entrepreneurial spin-out and arms-length 
innovation as tools in the firms’ innovation strategy. To increase the value creation from 
given firm activity, the parent firm should aim to be the core of a cluster of related   18 
ventures  that  stand  at  a  larger  distance  from  the  firm  as  the  risks  increase  and  the 
compatibility of assets is reduced. But there is definitely a strong case for the parent 
firm’s involvement. Strategic dispute driven spin-out fails to adequately internalize the 
knowledge spillovers and both the entrepreneur spinning out and the parent firm could 
do better by managing the entrepreneurial venture strategically. 
Our  model,  however,  has  little  to  offer  on  how  this  process  is  to  be 
operationalized  in  detail.  The  many  complications  involved  in  choosing  the  right 
projects, selecting capable and motivated entrepreneurs, setting up the organization to 
commercialize and so forth, have all been abstracted away. Our model does show that 
vertical integration and knowledge sharing arrangements are better ways to internalize 
the direct knowledge spillovers from R&D to upstream entrepreneurial ventures, than, 
for  example,  intellectual  property  rights  protection  through  patents  and  licensing. 
Practical examples of such vertically integrated innovation chains are emerging in the 
world and our model illustrates what underlying basic mechanism may help explain that 
trend
13. 
The aggregate spillovers in the model, from upstream innovative entrepreneurs 
to downstream R&D labs and ultimately production, cannot effectively be internalized 
by  giving  individual  entrepreneurs  a  claim  on  specific  firms’  R&D  output  or  final 
product  sales.  The  nature  of  the  spillover  is  such  that  the  collective  entrepreneurial 
activity  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  collective  R&D  effort.  But  such  positive 
externalities can be internalized by knowledge sharing arrangements in the value chain. 
If arms-length entrepreneurial innovators share in the knowledge that is being and has 
been developed at the downstream firm, (such as is the case with for example IBM’s 
                                                 
13  Apple  computers,  for  example,  is  one  of  the  few  successful  vertically  integrated  tech  companies 
designing its own products, controlling marketing, even selling through Apple stores. Samsung is another 
firm that is relatively vertically integrated yet highly profitable.    19 
patent pool), then all entrepreneurial ventures in a firm’s innovation cluster benefit from 
the knowledge that their activity has helped create. In an open innovation structure, 
where knowledge is pooled, the knowledge spillovers remain positive externalities, but 
they  are  largely  offset  by  positive  externalities  that  flow  the  other  way.  Both 
intermediate and final goods producers should realize that capitalization on the positive 
knowledge spillovers that they generate for others may cause a reduction of knowledge 
flowing in and ultimately a collapse of innovation in the value chain. But firms are not 
the only ones that should take policy lessons away from our model. 
 
Public Policy 
Public policy makers are interested in increasing the rate of innovation in the system as 
a  whole  (more  precisely  getting  it  closer  to  the  optimal  rate  of  growth).  To  do  so 
efficiently they should realize that less government action is called for when knowledge 
flows are not inhibited. Strong protection of intellectual property rights is a policy that 
increases the creation and appropriation of knowledge, but does not necessarily increase 
commercialization and growth. In the absence of intellectual property rights, installing it 
is probably a good idea as knowledge creation is most likely going to be the bottleneck 
in innovation. But when new opportunities are accidental by-products, as they are in our 
model, then intellectual property rights protection may reduce the flow of ideas and 
rents  to  the  commercializers  and  thereby  also  reduce  the  indirect  but  potentially 
important positive productivity effect on future R&D. The latter effect may offset the 
positive effect of higher returns to and hence higher levels of R&D activity that IPR 
may create.     20 
Policies  that  would  improve  the  situation  unambiguously  in  our  model  will 
increase  R&D  activity  or  entrepreneurship  without  hurting  the  productivity  of  or 
incentives to undertake the other activity. Such policies are found in a broad range of 
policy domains. Reforms that enhance labor mobility between firms will increase and 
facilitate the flow of knowledge and arguably may even increase the productivity of 
R&D in generating more recognized opportunities for given levels of activity. It often 
takes some experience in an industry to see an opportunity when it presents itself. Along 
those lines one might also argue that educating engineers and technicians to at least 
consider the option of becoming an entrepreneur may stimulate the knowledge flow 
from R&D departments to the economy at large. Elements in labor regulation, such as 
the non-compete clauses, that inhibit the mobility of employees between jobs, firms and 
sectors should be reconsidered in light of this implication of our model.  
Finally,  the  central  government  could  provide  general  support  structures  for 
entrepreneurial activity to support the open innovation clusters of existing businesses as 
well as the challengers that such clusters are less likely to foster. A vibrant and well 
functioning market for venture capital and low regulatory and other barriers to new firm 
formation are high on most political agenda’s (European Commission, 2000; EVCA, 
2005). These policies are not straightforwardly justified using standard R&D-driven 
endogenous growth models, while in the context of our modified model they make 
perfect sense. 
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4.  Conclusion  
 
This paper develops a model of innovation-driven economic growth in which the role of 
knowledge  spillovers  between  knowledge  creation  (invention)  and  knowledge 
commercialization (innovation) is made explicit. With this model we aim to study the 
impact of such spillovers for strategic innovation management at the individual firm and 
aggregate economy level.  
A  contribution  of  the  paper  is  the  introduction  of  a  general  equilibrium 
innovation-driven  endogenous  growth  model  that  pays  attention  to  both  stages  of 
innovation process - invention and commercialization. Along with the model the paper 
introduces well-established and rigorous macro-economic modeling techniques to the 
field  of  strategic  entrepreneurship,  which  can  improve  the  understanding  of  the 
interplay  between  micro-level  innovation  management  and  macro-level  aggregate 
economic performance. 
We can derive a number of interesting policy implications from our model. First, 
innovation management, especially in final goods producing firms, should shift from a 
narrow  focus  on  improving  current  operations  to  also  be  attentive  to  potential 
innovations that lie outside the core business of the firm. In particular, ideas for new 
intermediate products and services that can be provided outside the firm should not be 
treated as threats but as opportunities.  
Second, vertical integration and knowledge sharing arrangements with upstream 
suppliers are better ways to internalize the direct knowledge spillovers from R&D to 
upstream  entrepreneurial  ventures,  than,  for  example,  intellectual  property  rights 
protection through patents and licensing.    22 
Third, the central government should shift focus from IPR-protection to direct 
R&D and entrepreneurship subsidies and support and should reconsider many labor 
market  arrangements  that  inhibit  the  knowledge  spillovers,  particularly  those  at  the 
aggregate level.  
We  conclude  from  our  analysis  that  the  full  internalization  of  knowledge 
spillovers may be achieved through a mix of intrapreneurship (incumbents exploiting 
new opportunities themselves) and strategic entrepreneurship (incumbents supporting 
strategic  new  entry)  at  the  firm  level,  and  policies  that  support  both  stages  in  the 
innovation process, knowledge creation and commercialization, at the aggregate level. 
  Limitations of our model include in particular the deterministic way of dealing 
with  opportunity  creation  and  recognition.  Uncertainty  is  essential  element  in 
entrepreneurial venturing and remains absent in our model. Also the assumed structure 
of  knowledge  spillovers  remains  to  be  validated  in  empirical  work.  The  existing 
literature is not contradicting our assumptions, but more careful analysis is required to 
establish the signs and magnitudes of the important parameters in our model. These 
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Figure 1:  Financial Flows in the model 
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